This paper considers secure communication over free-space optical (FSO) links suffering from turbulence-induced fading. In particular, we study the average secrecy capacity of applying physical layer security to achieve security in an FSO communication system with binary-level on-off keying intensity modulation and threshold detection, a widely used system in FSO communication. We first define the instantaneous secrecy capacity for our system and then provide a lower bound of it, which is achieved based on a simple design principle for practical applications and yields a simpler equation. We next derive a general expression of the average secrecy capacity and the corresponding lower bound based on bit error probabilities. Finally, numerical analysis is conducted for the special case of the correlated log-normal fading model to show the impacts of fading and channel correlation on the average secrecy capacity.
sive theoretical and experimental performance analysis has been conducted for FSO communications, only few studies on secrecy capacity of FSO systems have been done. [7] characterized the probability of positive secrecy capacity in the presence of atmospheric turbulence-induced random fading for two eavesdropping scenarios. In [2] , Wang et al. studied the capacity of secret key generation for air-to-ground FSO communication. And the secrecy capacity for indoor visible light communication without fading phenomenon based on multiple-input and single-output (MISO) Gaussian model was analyzed in [8] . More recently, numerical study on the secrecy capacity has been conducted in [9] for FSO channels based on the on-off keying (OOK) modulation and photon counting demodulation without considering the random fading effect.
In this paper, we study the average secrecy capacity of laser-based FSO communication systems where OOK intensity modulation with direct detection (IM/DD) is employed. Notice that, due to their simplicity and low cost, IM/DD systems are widely used in FSO communications [1] . Our contributions in this paper are summarized as follows.
• We define the instantaneous secrecy capacity of the FSO system with binary-level OOK intensity modulation and threshold detection under a given pair of fading states. • We derive a lower bound of the instantaneous secrecy capacity of the fading FSO system based on bit error probabilities, and prove that this lower bound is just the maximum instantaneous secrecy rate when the detection threshold at the eavesdropper is halfway between the expected outputs of the binary input symbol '0' and '1'. • With the help of the above result, we derive a general expression of the average secrecy capacity of the fading FSO system and also its lower bound. • By specializing the average secrecy capacity to the correlated log-normal fading model, we provide numerical analysis to explore the impacts of fading, channel correlation and atmospheric turbulence (fading) strength on the secrecy capacity, respectively.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND METRICS A. System model
We consider a laser-based FSO system in which a transmitter (named Alice) tries to transmit confidential messages ISITA2016, Monterey, California, USA, October 30-November 2, 2016
Copyright (C) 2016 by IEICE to a receiver (named Bob) over a wireless optical link in the presence of an eavesdropper (named Eve). In the FSO system we consider that the binary-level on-off keying modulation and threshold detection are adopted [10] , [11] .
The channel model of the FSO communication system is given by the expression
where u ∈ {b, e} denotes the user Bob or Eve, Y u is the electric current of the signal received at u, η is photo-diode responsivity, I tx denotes the radiant emittance of the laser beam at transmitter, e −δdu represents the intensity attenuation loss in free space (mainly due to absorption and scattering), δ being an attenuation loss coefficient and d u the distance from the transmitter to u [12] , H u is a random variable (RV) that models the normalized optical irradiance fluctuation of the channel to u (caused by refractive-index variations), X ∈ {0, 1} is the binary input symbol, and Z u ∼ N (0, σ 2 u ) models the combined effects of the thermal noise and the background noise at the receiver [2] . The system model in (1) can be simplified as
where S u = ηI tx e −δdu represents the electric current received at u for the on-state input (symbol '1') in the absence of atmospheric turbulence-induced irradiance fluctuation. The input probability of X is given by P X (1) = q and P X (0) = 1 − q with q ∈ [0, 1]. In the threshold detector, the threshold value is denoted by τ u and the binary output is denoted byX u . In this model, the maximum power constraint is imposed for the transmission of each symbol, that is, the radiant emittance for symbol '1' is just the maximum value I tx and that for symbol '0' is zero. We assume σ b = σ e , in order to focus on exploring the impact of fading on the secrecy capacity.
It is assumed that both Bob's and Eve's channels are under quasi-static fading, that is, H b and H e , albeit random, are constants during the transmission of an entire codeword (i.e., a coherence interval) and, moreover, vary independently from codeword to codeword. Bob and Eve are assumed to know their own channel states H b and H e , and Alice is assumed to know both channel states before the transmission of the codeword. This assumption corresponds to the situation, for example, where Eve is another active user in the wireless TDMA network [13] .
B. Performance metrics
In this paper, we will use the secrecy capacity to measure the performance of applying the physical layer security scheme in the considered system. Before defining the secrecy capacity, we will introduce the definition of capacity in our model in the hope of making the definition of secrecy capacity easier to understand. Usually, capacity is a function of the matrix of channel transition probabilities in a discrete memoryless channel [14] , for instance, a function of the detection threshold τ under a given fading coefficient h in our system, i.e., C(τ ; h) = max q I(X;X), where I(·) refers to the mutual information [14] . However, in the considered system, Alice can adjust the detection threshold τ and also the input probability parameter q, thus the instantaneous capacity is given by C(h) = max q,τ I(X;X) correspondingly 1 . Since Alice cannot control and also doesn't know Eve's detection threshold, the secrecy capacity should be achieved by assuming that Eve adopts its optimal detection threshold for any q. Since σ b = σ e is assumed, we are able to construct a wire-tap channel such that Bob's channel is more capable than Eve's channel when h b > h e [15] . Hence, the instantaneous secrecy capacity of the considered system under fading states h b and h e is defined by
Meanwhile, when Alice and Eve's detection thresholds are given, the maximum instantaneous secrecy rate is defined by
III. SECRECY CAPACITY ANALYSIS A. Bit error probability
In binary-level OOK, each bit symbol is transmitted by pulsing the light source either on (for input symbol '1') or off (for '0') during each bit time. In the corresponding threshold detection, we say a '1' is received when the output of the detector exceeds a threshold value, or else a '0' is received during each bit time [11] . Because of noise, errors may be made at Bob or Eve in determining the actual symbols transmitted. For instance, a '0' might be mistaken for a '1', which is denoted by P (1|0). Also a '1' might be mistaken for a '0', which is denoted by P (0|1). In the case a '0' is transmitted, the received signal is observed to be independent of irradiance fading state, which is given by Y u ∼ N (0, σ 2 u ) with u ∈ {b, e}. On the other hand, when a '1' is transmitted, the received signal under a given realization h u of fading state H u is given by Y u ∼ N (y u , σ 2 u ), where y u = S u h u denotes the mean value of output signal current under the state h u .
For a given detection threshold τ u at user u, the bit error probabilities of u's channel can be derived by
A special scenario of the detection thresholds that has been widely used in the literature, see [11] , [16] , are
where E(Y b |X = 1, h b ) refers to the Bob's expected signal amplitude for bit '1' conditioned on a particular state h b , and the other similar notations can be explained likewise. In our channel model,
Then, the bit error probabilities under this special scenario are
and
For simplicity, let P b (1|0) = P b (0|1) = ε b and P e (1|0) = P e (0|1) = ε e . This shows that the "halfway" settings of the threshold value in (7) and (8) lead to binary symmetric channels with crossover probabilities ε b for Bob's channel and ε e for Eve's channel.
B. Lower bound of instantaneous secrecy capacity
Finding a closed-form result of C s is often a tedious if not impossible task as the maximization operation relies on several parameters like the channel fading states H b and H e , noises Z b and Z e , and detection thresholds τ b and τ e . We now derive a lower bound of the instantaneous secrecy capacity under a given pair of states h b and h e .
where [x] + = max{0, x}, I X;X|q is the mutual information between X andX conditioned on q. We use C s (h b , h e ) to denote this lower bound. To calculate C s (h b , h e ), we have the following lemma. Lemma 1: When q = 1/2, the eavesdropper channel's maximum information rate under the fading state h e , max τ e I X;X e |q = 1 2 , is achieved by the "halfway" setting of the threshold value in (8) .
Proof: When q = 1/2, we have
where ε e 0 = P e (1|0) and ε e 1 = P e (0|1). Substituting ε e 0 and ε e 1 in (5) and (6) into (11), we then calculate the following maximum value max τe∈[0,∞)
Let f (τ e ) = I(X;X e |q = 1 2 ), and we expect that f (τ e ) is a concave function of τ e . Denoting τ e * as the parameter achieving the maximum value of max τe∈[0,∞) f (τ e ), we can derive τ e * by letting the first derivative of f (τ e ) with respect to τ e equal to 0. And we have ∂f (τ e ) ∂τ e = 1 2 log 2
It can be easily validated that τ e * = S e h e /2 makes ∂f (τe) ∂τe = 0, which indicates the maximum value is achieved at τ e * = S e h e /2. Furthermore, numerical check has also been conducted to validate that τ e * = S e h e /2 maximizes f (τ e ). Therefore, Lemma 1 is proved.
From Lemma 1, we have
Although Lemma 1 is built for Eve's channel, it also applies to Bob's channel. Therefore, we can derive the lower bound of secrecy capacity for any h b and h e as
where H(·) is the binary entropy function given by
Lemma 2: When τ b and τ e adopt the "halfway" settings given in (7) and (8), the maximum instantaneous secrecy rate is given by
and it is achieved when the input probability q = 1/2. The proof is straightforward since the channel for the scenario τ b = y b /2 and τ e = y e /2 can be viewed as a binary symmetric broadcast channel (BSBC), of which the secrecy capacity is given in [17, Lemma 1].
From Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we observe that the maximum instantaneous secrecy rate under the "halfway" settings of the threshold value in (7) and (8) equals to the lower bound of instantaneous secrecy capacity, that is
C. Average secrecy capacity
Like the calculation of average secrecy capacity of fading wire-tap channel in wireless radio-frequency (RF) communication [13] , the average secrecy capacity for the concerned FSO model is similarly calculated by first deriving the instantaneous secrecy capacity for a given pair of states h b and h e and then integrating them over the domain of (H b , H e ). Thus, we establish the following theorem on the average secrecy capacity of the concerned FSO system and a lower bound to simplify its calculation.
Theorem 1: For the concerned binary-level OOK modulation and threshold detection, the average secrecy capacity of the FSO channel is given by
where C s (h b , h e ) is given in (3) and f H b ,He (h b , h e ) is the joint probability density function (PDF) of the RVs H b and H e . Furthermore, it is lower bounded by
where H(·) is given in (16) , and ε b and ε e are given in (9) and (10), respectively. The proof of Theorem 1 is straightforward and has been put in the full paper [18] . It is worth noting that C s is estimated to be tight since the "halfway" setting of the detection threshold yields a minimum error probability 2 . Moreover, it is notable that the lower bound, which greatly simplified our secrecy capacity formula, can be achieved based on a simple design principle in practical applications.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
Several statistical channel models have been proposed in the literature for the distribution of turbulence-induced fading in FSO systems. It is well accepted that for weak to moderate turbulence strength the log-normal model is valid, for moderate to strong turbulence the gamma-gamma model is effective, and in the limit of strong turbulence (i.e., in saturation regime and beyond) the negative exponential model is suitable [12] .
A. Log-normally distributed irradiance model
We now specializes the secrecy capacity result to the lognormally distributed irradiance model, which applies to the FSO systems deployed over relatively short ranges in urban areas [1] . Recall that H u is a mean-normalized irradiance fading RV. In the log-normal fading model, the PDF of H u is
where H u = e Tu with T u ∼ N(μ Tu , σ 2 Tu ), and σ 2 Tu is the Rytov variance, a parameter characterizing the strength of atmospheric turbulence. Note that the mean-normalized condition E[H u ] = 1 requires the choice of μ Tu = −σ 2 Tu /2. In general, σ 2
Tu is a function of the refractive structure index C 2 n (·) and the horizontal distance L traveled by the optical radiation. C 2 n (·) typically ranges from 10 −12 m −2/3 for the strong turbulence to 10 −17 m −2/3 for the weak turbulence with a typical average value being 10 −15 m −2/3 . However, for horizontal optical propagation, as is the case in most terrestrial applications, the refractive structure index C 2 n is constant and the Rytov variance is thus given by [12] 
where k is the wave number (i.e., k = 2π/λ with λ the optical wavelength). Note that for horizontal communication, L equals [5] . In table I, we list pairs of σ 2 Tu and L for a typical wavelength λ = 1.5 μm and C 2 n = 10 −15 m −2/3 based on (22).
When Eve's location is close to Bob, H b and H e are assumed to be correlated as the signals received by them go through a similar atmospheric environment [7] , [16] . Hence, their joint PDF [16] is given in (23) at the bottom of this page. In (23), ρ denotes the correlation coefficient between T b and T e . Similarly, the correlation coefficient between H b and H e is denoted by ρ H , and it is related to ρ as follows [16] 
Here, ρ H can be calculated based on the experimental data and its mathematical definition
By substituting (23) into (20), we can derive the lower bound of secrecy capacity under the log-normally distributed irradiance model.
B. Numerical analysis
Since even the numerical simulation of the exact average secrecy capacity is very difficult, we will focus on analyzing the numerical results of the lower bound of average secrecy capacity. To illustrate the impact of correlation between Bob's and Eve's channels on the average secrecy capacity, we show in Fig. 1 how C s varies with the average electrical signal-tonoise ratio (SNR) at Bob, i.e., γ b = S b σ b , for a given average electrical SNR at Eve, i.e., γ e = Se σe , under several channel correlation levels. The parameters in Fig. 1 are set to γ e = 0 dB and σ 2 T b = σ 2 Te = 1. Figure 1 shows that for given γ b and γ e , C s is smaller when H b and H e are more correlated, which indicates that the channel correlation has a negative impact on the average secrecy capacity. However, such impact becomes very weak (almost disappeared) when γ b γ e . Figure 1 also shows that a moderate channel correlation (e.g., ρ = 0.1) does not have significant effect on the secrecy capacity.
To illustrate the impact of fading on the average secrecy capacity, we add in Fig. 1 the similarly defined lower bound of secrecy capacity in additive white Gaussian (AWGN) channels with the same γ b and γ e as in fading channels. One can easily observe that, in AWGN channels, positive secrecy capacity cannot be achieved when γ b ≤ γ e , i.e., γ b ≤ 0 dB in Fig.  1 . On the contrary, in the presence of fading, positive secrecy capacity can still be achieved even when γ b ≤ γ e . Note that a similar conclusion has been made in RF communication [4] . However, in the case γ b is much larger than γ e , one can observe that C s of the fading channels is smaller than that of the AWGN channels, which indicates fading has a negative impact on the secrecy capacity when γ b γ e . Figure 2 depicts how the turbulence (fading) strength actually affects the secrecy capacity in weak atmospheric turbulence. We use three values of σ 2 T b as given in Table I while keeping σ 2 Te fixed to show three different cases:
Te and σ 2 T b < σ 2 Te . One can observe that in typical laser communication scenario with γ b γ e (e.g., γ b = 10 dB in Fig. 2) , C s is larger for a weaker turbulence like σ 2 T b < σ 2 Te , which indicates that the atmospheric turbulence has a negative impact on the secrecy capacity. However, in other scenarios when γ b is not that large (or maybe smaller) compared to γ e , the turbulence actually is helpful to the secrecy capacity.
V. CONCLUSION In this paper, we studied the problem of transmitting confidential information between two legitimate users over the FSO link in the presence of a malicious eavesdropper. We have established a general formula for the average secrecy capacity of the laser-based FSO system with OOK modulation and threshold detection. We then specialized the formula to the particular correlated log-normal fading model and conducted numerical analysis. Our results reveal that turbulence-induced fading H u as well as the turbulence strength σ 2
Tu has a negative impact on the secrecy capacity when Bob's channel condition is much better than Eve's (i.e., γ b γ e ), but is possible to provide positive impact otherwise. On the other hand, channel correlation is harmful to the secrecy capacity in all conditions, which agrees with the previous result regarding the impact of channel correlation on secrecy capacity in wireless RF communication [19] .
